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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the welfare effects of international competition in the market for 
innovations, and analyzes how competition affects the costs and the benefits of 
cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. I set up a two-country quality-ladder 
growth model where the leader, the home country, has R&D firms innovating in all 
sectors of the economy, and the follower, the foreign country, shows innovating firms 
only in a subset of industries. The measure of the set of sectors where R&D workers 
from both countries compete for innovation determines the scale of international 
Schumpeterian competition. Both governments engage in a strategic R&D subsidy 
game and respond optimally to changes in competition. For a given level of subsidies, 
increases in foreign competition raise the quality of goods available (growth effect) and 
lowers domestic profits (business-stealing effect); the overall effect of competition on 
domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting forces. 
When governments play a strategic subsidy game, increases in foreign competition 
trigger a defensive innovation policy mechanism that raises the optimal domestic R&D 
subsidy. Cooperation in subsidies leads both countries to set higher subsidies. Finally, 
while cooperation is beneficial for the global economy, there exists a threshold level of 
competition below which the home country experiences welfare losses under 
cooperation. 
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International Schumpeterian competition and optimal
R&D subsidies∗
Giammario Impullitti†
1 Introduction
In the decades following World War II, U.S. firms were undisputedly the global leaders in the
production and provision of innovation-intensive goods and services. In the 1970s and early
1980s, however, Japanese and European firms began to challenge American technological lead-
ership in high-tech industries such as electronics, aircraft, scientific instruments, and medical
equipment.1 Recently, Asia’s emerging giants, India and China, have reported record levels of
exports in highly sophisticated products and services, and have become global players in those
markets.2 These developments have fueled debates on the welfare eﬀects of increasing foreign
competition in innovation-intensive industries, and have led academics and policy makers to
discuss the virtues and dangers of diﬀerent policy responses to competition3.
In this paper I study the eﬀects of international competition on domestic welfare and on
the double role of R&D subsidies in stimulating innovation and protecting national interests.
∗I thank for helpful discussions and comments Guido Cozzi, Jonathan Eaton, Stefano Eusepi, Boyan Jo-
vanovic, Omar Licadro, Ramon Marimon, Paul Segerstrom, Gianluca Violante, and seminar participants at
NYU, EUI Florence, SED 2006 Vancouver. All errors are mine. A previous version of this paper circulated
under the title “International competition and defensive R&D subsidies in growing economies”.
†Giammario Impullitti, IMT Lucca and Max Weber Fellow EUI Florence. Email:
g.impullitti@imtlucca.it, and giammario.impullitti@eui.eu.
1Between 1980 and 1991 the U.S. global market shares in high-tech markets declined by 16 percent, while
Japan’s share increased by about 30 percent (NSF 2006). Moreover, Japan’s share of high-tech export doubled
from about 7 percent in 1970-73 to about 16 percent in 1988-89, while the US share declined from 30 percent
to about 21 percent. (Guerrieri and Milana, 1991, and Tyson, 1992).
2Rodrik (2006) provides a measure of China’s export sophistication which shows that in the 1990s the Chinese
export bundle was that of a country with an income per-capita level three times higher than China. Kochhar,
Rajan, Surbamanian, and Tokatlidis (2006) document the increase in the skill content of India’s export: they
find that the share of export in skill-intensive goods rose from 25 percent in 1970 to 65 percent in 2002.
3See Krugman (1996) and Tyson (1992) for a discussion of the “competitiveness debate” in the U.S. in
the 1980s. For the current debate on the eﬀects of technological catching-up see Baumol and Gomory (2000),
Samuelson (2004), Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasn (2004), Blinder (2005).
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While trade policies such as tariﬀs and export subsidies are restricted by the WTO and other
international institutions, generalized subsidies to R&D are left to the discretion of single gov-
ernments. Hence policy makers can use research subsidies to promote the competitiveness of
national firms in the global economy. Moreover, the strategic nature of R&D subsidies leads
naturally to consider possible national and global gains from policy cooperation. Therefore, I
study the eﬀects of international competition on cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsi-
dies.
I set up a non-scale, fully-endogenous, Schumpeterian growthmodel (Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son, 1998, Howitt, 1999, Young, 1998, Peretto, 1998), with two countries, domestic and foreign,
having the same population, preferences and technology, but diﬀerent distributions of research
eﬀorts across industries, and autonomously choosing their innovation subsidy. Trade is free and
multinational corporations are active in all sectors of the economy. In this environment growth
is driven by R&D investment of profit-maximizing firms competing to develop higher-quality
products and obtain leadership in the global market.
Economists have explored the welfare eﬀects of competition focusing on changes in product
market competition produced by foreign entry. I propose a diﬀerent, and complementary,
measure that focuses on competition in the innovation activity and is based on the geographical
distribution of R&D investment. Precisely, I suppose that the domestic country is the leading
economy in that its firms invest in R&D in all industries, while foreign firms innovate and
compete with domestic leaders only in a subset of the entire spectrum of industries. The measure
of the subset where researchers from both countries compete will be the index of international
competition.4 As a consequence, increases in international competition are unidirectional in
that they represent the penetration of foreign researchers into industries where previously only
domestic innovators had been active.5
The second component of the model is the introduction of a strategic R&D subsidy game in
4This idea is similar to that expressed in Krugman (1979) where the leading country is assumed to be able
to virtually produce all goods in the economy, while the follower country can produce only the "old" goods. As
in the present paper both countries have the same preferences, technology and environment, and the diﬀerence
in production possibilities is exogenous. Krugman suggests that the source of the productive advantage of the
leading economy can be related to more skilled labor force, external economies, or to a diﬀerence in “social
atomosphere”.
5Except for the distribution of research eﬀorts the two countries have a similar structure. This implies that
the model is more suitable to study the eﬀect of foreign competition coming from countries that are structurally
not too diﬀerent from the domestic one. As I will discuss later, if one wants to analyze the eﬀect of Indian and
Chinese competition on advanced industrial countries, the setup must be modified accordingly.
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the endogenous growth framework. Each government sets subsidies autonomously in order to
maximize national welfare, thereby responding optimally both to changes in the other country’s
subsidy and in international competition. There are two basic motivations for R&D subsidies
in this economy: the presence of knowledge spillovers, typical of R&D-driven growth models,
leads to a non-eﬃcient market allocation of research eﬀort, so creating the scope for policy
intervention. Second, the presence of foreign firms in innovation races produces a strategic
motive for subsidies: R&D subsidies can be used to support national firms in the competition
for global leadership.
Models of trade and growth turn out to be diﬃcult to solve when countries are asymmetric
in their economic structure and in their policy, thus I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy
and explore its qualitative properties numerically.6 I focus on three specific issues: i) the
eﬀects of foreign competition on domestic welfare for a given level of domestic and foreign
R&D subsidies; ii) the eﬀects of competition on the optimal domestic subsidy, when countries
play a non-cooperative subsidy game. iii) the influence of competition on domestic and foreign
incentives to set R&D subsidies cooperatively.
The main results are as follows. Increases in foreign competition have two opposite eﬀects on
domestic welfare: a growth eﬀect (henceforth GRE) and a business-stealing eﬀect (henceforth
BSE). The GRE is related to increases in research eﬃciency brought about by a more equal
distribution of R&D investment in the global economy. Following Eaton and Kortum (1999),
I assume that R&D technology has decreasing returns at the country level. This technology
specification implies that entry of foreign researchers leads to a more eﬃcient international
division of research labor and increases innovation and global growth. As is common in quality-
ladder models, growth increases welfare through the eﬀect of quality improvements on consumer
surplus. This is the GRE of competition, which benefits consumers in both countries.
Entry of foreign R&D workers into new sectors also implies that, with a probability pro-
portional to their research eﬀort, monopoly rents shift from domestic to foreign firms. “Home
bias” in asset ownership documented in the literature implies that profit-shifting has a negative
impact on domestic income and welfare - this is BSE.7 It follows that the eﬀect of competition
on domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of the GRE and the BSE: if the GRE
6See Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) for a smilar approach to the solution of quality ladders model with
asymmetric countries.
7For evidence on “home bias” see for instance French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995).
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is stronger (weaker) than the BSE, competition raises (reduces) domestic welfare.
When both countries play a strategic subsidy game and respond optimally to changes in
competition, I find that increases in competition raise the scale of foreign business-stealing,
thereby increasing the scope for strategic subsidies in the home country. Hence, competition
increases the role of subsidies as a rent-protecting device and triggers a sort of defensive inno-
vation policy mechanism.8 Finally, I show that subsidy cooperation is beneficial for the global
economy, but the domestic country loses from cooperation at low levels of competition. As-
suming that there is no compensation mechanism, this implies that policy cooperation will not
be implemented at low levels of competition.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, the BSE of R&D subsidies has
its origins in the strategic trade and industrial policy literature. Since the seminal paper by
Spencer and Brander (1983), works in this area have focused on the robustness of the results
to diﬀerent types of market structures, to the presence of government and firms commitment,
and to the existence, and typology, of spillovers related to innovation activity (Eaton and
Grossman, 1986, Bagwell and Staiger, 1994, Brander, 1995, Maggi, 1996, Neary and Leahy,
2000, and Leahy and Neary, 1999, and 2001).
This literature has not devoted much attention to the eﬀects of international competition
and trade liberalization on strategic R&D subsidies. As a consequence, the beneficial eﬀect of
trade on consumer’ surplus - though price reduction and/or improvements in goods’ quality-
could not be taken into account.9 Secondly, the works that have studied the scope for R&D
cooperation have focused on cooperation between firms rather than between governments.10
Recently Haaland and Kind (2007) have filled the gap by studying the eﬀects of trade
liberalization and of changes in PMC on private and public incentives for R&D investment
within a strategic innovation policy framework. In view of the important eﬀects of trade on
relative prices and, consequently, on consumer surplus, they have studied the interplay of the
business-stealing and the consumer surplus motive for R&D subsidies. Including the consumer
surplus eﬀect in the analysis is particularly relevant when both trade and strategic policies have
eﬀects on the innovation activity. Finally, the scope for cooperation in R&D at the policy stage
8As commonly occurs in quality-ladder models, the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on the model’s
features, especially on the specification of parameters. I show that the results in the paper hold also for
parameters specifications leading to a negative optimal R&D subsidy.
9By assuming that all export is directed to a third country, the previuos literature has focused mainly on
the business-stealing motive.
10See for instance Leahy and Neary (2004).
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was also analyzed.11
These papers, as well as the others in the strategic trade and industrial policy literature, are
confined to static models where the dynamic eﬀects of innovation are not taken into account.
Brander (1995) suggests that this theoretical feature may be responsible for the small gains
and losses from strategic policies found in the empirical tests of these models. He conjectures
that exploring the growth eﬀects of such policies might increase their quantitative relevance.
Following Haaland and Kind (2007) I study the impact of international competition on
cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies. I depart from this paper, as well as, from the
existing strategic trade and industrial policy works in two ways: first, in my model innovation is
a cumulative process aﬀecting the long-run growth rate of the economy. Introducing endogenous
growth allows me to take into account both the current and the future eﬀects of competition on
consumer surplus; the existing static models of innovation and strategic R&D policies cannot
account for the long-run eﬀects on consumer surplus.12 One implication is that, as conjectured
in Brander (1995), introducing endogenous growth magnifies the welfare eﬀects of strategic
policies. Second, while the existing literature has focused on the eﬀects of changes in the market
structure on innovation and optimal strategic subsidies, I study international competition in
the innovation activity. The interaction between this dimension of competition and strategic
policies cannot be analyzed in the two-sector models used in the strategic policy literature.
The monopolistic competitive market structure of quality-ladder models proves more suitable
for this target.13
The second strand of related works is the one exploring the welfare eﬀects of competition in
endogenous growth frameworks (i.e. Kludert and Smulders,1997, and Tang and Waelde, 2001),
as well as that studying the links between competition, national and/or international, and
growth (i.e., Aghion et. al., 2006, Boldrin and Levine, 2005, Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2007,
Melitz, 2003, Navas and Licandro, 2006, Peretto, 2003). The eﬃciency eﬀect of competition
on growth is similar in the spirit to the selection eﬀect formalized in the recent literature on
trade, firms heterogeneity, and productivity. In Melitz (2003) exposure to trade induces the
11On policy competition and cooperation see also the companion paper Haaland and Kind (2006).
12In line with my work, Etro (2006) introduces a strategic R&D subsidy game into a quality-ladder growth
model and, leaving aside changes in any dimension of competition, analyzes the case for international coordi-
nation of research policies.
13This advantage, though, is obtained at the expense of simplifying the interaction among firms in the product
market. As pointed put by Neary (2001) using a monopolisitc competitive framework does not allow accounting
for strategic interaction among firms.
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less productive firms to exit the market, thus increasing the average productivity level of the
economy. Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2007) show that when a this mechanism is nested into a
model of growth through expanding variety (Romer, 1992) foreign entry can aﬀect the long-run
growth rate of the economy. The growth eﬀect of international competition in the present paper
is, though, substantially diﬀerent from those in the existing literature for the following reasons:
first, the eﬀect is produced by foreign entry in R&D and not by product market competition;
second, the growth mechanism does not operate through the productivity gap between entrant
and exiting firms - firms are homogenous in production - but through improvements in the
eﬃciency of the innovation activity in the newly competitive sectors.
A final distinguishing feature of this paper is that it does not limit the analysis to studying
the welfare eﬀects of competition and informally drawing suggestions for policy interventions, as
most existing works do, but it explores the optimal strategic R&D subsidy response to foreign
competition.14
2 The model
In this section I set up the model and derive the steady state equilibrium system of equations.
2.1 Households
Consider a two-country economy in which population, preferences, technologies, and institu-
tions are identical. Households have intertemporally additively separable preferences with unit
elasticity over an infinite set of consumption goods indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]. Each household is
endowed with a unit of labor time whose supply generates no disutility. Dropping country
indexes for notational simplicity, households choose their optimal consumption bundle for each
date by solving the following optimization problem:
maxU =
Z ∞
0
N0e−(ρ−n)t log u(t)dt (1)
subject to
log u(t) ≡
Z 1
0
log
⎡
⎣
jmax(ω,t)X
j=0
λj(ω,t)q(j, ω, t)
⎤
⎦ dω
14This feature is related to the literature on optimal R&D subsidies in endogenous growth models (see for
instance Segerstrom 1998, and Jones and Williams 2000). It allows us to obtain separate results for the eﬀects
of competition on welfare and on the optimal subsidy. In most of the existing literature of the welfare eﬀect of
international competition (and of trade liberalization) policy intervention is only discussed, informally, in those
cases when welfare is negatively aﬀected.
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c(t) ≡
Z 1
0
⎡
⎣
jmax(ω,t)X
j=0
p(j, ω, t)q(j, ω, t)
⎤
⎦ dω
W (0) + Z(0)−
Z ∞
0
N0e−
? t
0 (r(τ)−n)dτTdt =
Z ∞
0
N0e−
? t
0 (r(τ)−n)dτc(t)dt
where N0 is the initial population and n is its constant growth rate, ρ is the common rate of
time preference - with ρ > n - and r(t) is the market interest rate on a risk-free bond available in
both countries. q(j, ω, t) is the per-member flow of good ω, of quality j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, purchased
by a household at time t ≥ 0. p(j, ω, t) is the price of good ω of quality j at time t, c(t) is
nominal expenditure, and W (0) and Z(0) are human and non-human wealth levels. A new
vintage of a good ω yields a quality equal to λ times the quality of the previous vintage, with
λ > 1. Diﬀerent versions of the same good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes
after adjusting for their quality ratios, and jmax(ω, t) denotes the maximum quality in which
the good ω is available at time t. As is common in quality ladders models I will assume price
competition at all dates, which implies that in equilibrium only the top quality product is
produced and consumed in positive amounts. T is a per-capita lump-sum tax.
The instantaneous utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution between every pair
of product lines. Thus, households maximize static utility by spreading their expenditures c(t)
evenly across the product line and by purchasing in each line only the product with the lowest
price per unit of quality, that is the product of quality j = jmax(ω, t). Hence, the household’s
demand of each product is:
q(j, ω, t) =
c(t)
p(j, ω, t)
for j = jmax(ω, t) and is zero otherwise (2)
The presence of a lump sum tax does not change the standard solution of the intertemporal
maximization problem, which is:
·
c
c
= r(t)− ρ (3)
2.2 Product market
In each country, firms can hire workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0, 1] using
a linear technology; one worker produces one unit of product. The wage rate is wK , where
K = D,F is the country indicator, domestic (D) and foreign (F ). However, in each industry
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the top quality product can be manufactured only by the firm that has discovered it, whose
rights are protected by a perfectly enforceable world-wide patent law. I assume that technology
is mobile, in the sense that a firm that owns the technology can use it everywhere. Hence,
multinational companies are free to establish subsidiaries in low wage countries to carry out
the manufacturing of their products so, in equilibrium wages will equalize. I choose the wage
as the numeraire, that is: wD = wF = 1.
As is usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (e.g. Grossman and Helpman,
1991 and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), the next best vintage of a good is invented by means of the
R&D performed by challenger firms in order to earn monopoly profits that will be destroyed by
the next innovator. During each temporary monopoly, the patent holder can sell the product
at prices higher than the unit cost. I assume that the patent becomes obsolete when further
innovation occurs in the industry. The unit elastic demand structure encourages the monopolist
to set the highest possible price to maximize profits, while the existence of a competitive fringe
sets a ceiling equal to the world’s lowest unit cost of the previous quality product. This allows
us to conclude that the price p (jmax(ω, t), ω, t) of every top quality good is:
p (jmax(ω, t), ω, t) = λ, for all ω ∈ [0, 1] and t ≥ 0. (4)
From the static consumer demand (2), we can conclude that the demand for each product
ω is:
(cD(t) + cF (t))N(t)
λ
= q (ω, t) , (5)
where cD(t) and cF (t) are domestic and foreign expenditures at time t. The above equation
implies that, in equilibrium, supply and demand of every consumption good coincides. It
follows that monopoly profits accruing to global quality leaders from country k = D,F in
sector ω will be equal to
πK(ω, t) = q (ω, t) (λ− 1) = (cD(t) + cF (t))N(t)
µ
1− 1
λ
¶
. (6)
2.3 R&D races
In each industry, leaders are challenged by the R&D firms that employ workers and produce
a probability intensity of inventing the next version of their products. The arrival rate of
innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω, t), which is the aggregate summation of the Poisson
8
arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D firms targeting product ω. Each R&D firm can
produce a Poisson arrival rate of innovation according to the following technology:
IKi (ω, t) =
AlKi (ω, t)
³
LK(ω,t)
X(ω,t)
´−α
X(ω, t)
, (7)
where X(ω, t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity in the invention of the next quality
product in industry ω, α > 0 represents a research externality, LK(ω, t) =
P
i l
K
i (ω, t) is the
total labor used by R&D firms and IK(ω, t) =
P
i I
K
i (ω, t) is the total investment in R&D (total
arrival rate) in country K. This technology implies that each firm’s instantaneous probability
of success is a decreasing function of the total national R&D investment in the industry. One
motivation for this industry and country-specific externality in research technology could be the
presence of fixed costs, such as lab equipment. Another motivation can be related to workers
with heterogeneous ability. Eaton and Kortum (1999) show that this type of technology can be
obtained assuming that all workers are equally productive in manufacturing goods, but higher
skilled labor is more productive in research: as investment in research increases workers of
lower ability will be used and R&D productivity will decline.15 In a multicountry quality-ladder
growth model they estimate the degree of decreasing returns in R&D and find the technology
to be far from the linear case assumed in many R&D-driven growth models.16
The technological complexity index X(ω, t) was introduced into endogenous growth theory
after Jones’ (1995) empirical criticism of R&D-driven growth models generating scale eﬀects in
the steady state per-capita growth rate. I will use the specification introduced by Dinopoulos
and Thompson (1998), that is
X(ω, t) = 2κN(t), (8)
with positive κ, thereby formalizing the idea that it is more diﬃcult to introduce a new product
in a more crowded market. This specification rules out implausible scale eﬀects and allows for
15This microfundation has been suggested in Phelps (1966), where a technology similar to (7) is obtained
assuming that workers abilities are drawn from a Pareto distribution. In my model the simplifying assumption
of global labor markets does not allow this type of microfundation. In the companion paper Impullitti (2007)
I remove this hypothesis and provide a microfoudation of the R&D technology based on heteregeneous workers
skills. As I will discuss later, and as I show in the companion paper, removing the assumption of perfectly
global labor markets strengthens my basic findings.
16Eaton and Kortum (1999) oﬀers particularly appropriate empirical support for motivating this choice of
technology because they use a multicountry quality-ladder model with international R&D spillovers similar to
the one used here. For additional empirical evidence supporting the presence of decreasing returns to R&D,
but limited to U.S. data, see Hall et. al. (1988), Pakes and Griliches (1984), and Kortum (1993).
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sustained per-capita growth without population growth, leading to a class of models also known
as fully-endogenous growth frameworks (see Aghion and Howitt 2005).
Governments subsidize R&D expenditures at the rate sK. Each R&D firm chooses lKi
in order to maximize its expected discounted profits. Free entry into R&D races drives the
expected profits to zero, generating the following equilibrium condition:
vK(ω, t)
A
³
LK(ω,t)
X(ω,t)
´−α
X(ω, t)
= (1− sK). (9)
where vK(ω, t) is the present value of a firm that produces good ω in country K = D,F . The
presence of eﬃcient financial markets implies that the expected rate of return of a stock issued
by an R&D firm is equal to the riskless rate of return r(t). It follows that the expected value
of a firm is:
vK(ω, t) =
πK (ω, t)
r(t) + I(ω, t)−
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t)
=
q (ω, t) (λ− 1)
r(t) + I(ω, t)−
.
vK(ω,t)
vK(ω,t)
, (10)
where I(ω, t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy
the monopolist’s profits in industry ω. In the absence of any cost advantage in doing R&D,
the usual Arrow eﬀect (Aghion and Howitt 1992) implies that the monopolist does not find it
profitable to undertake any R&D. Substituting for the value of the firm from (10) into (9) we
obtain:
N(t)(cD(t) + cF (t))
¡
λ−1
λ
¢
r(t) + I(ω, t)−
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t)
µ
LK(ω, t)
X(ω, t)
¶−α
=
(1− sK)X(ω, t)
A
, (11)
where I have substituted the profit equation (6) into the equation for the value of the firm.
This condition, together with the Euler equation summarizes the utility maximizing household
choice of consumption and savings, and the profit maximizing choice of manufacturing and
R&D firms.
2.4 International R&D competition
The scale of foreign competition in this model is determined by the measure of the set of sectors
where firms from both countries compete in R&D. Let ω ∈ (0, 1) be the set of industries where
domestic and foreign researchers compete to discover the next vintage of products. Therefore
the composition of worldwide investment in innovation will be the following:
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I(ω, t) = IDc (ω, t) + I
F (ω, t) = IDc (t) + I
F (t), for ω ≤ ω
I(ω, t) = IDm(ω, t) = I
D
m(t), for ω > ω
X(ω, t) = 2κN(t) for all ω,
where κ > 0, IDc (ω, t) and IDm(ω, t) are country D’s investment in R&D in the competitive and
in the non-competitive sectors respectively, and IF (ω, t) is the research investment of country
F. The symmetric structure of the model leads us to study only symmetric allocations of R&D
investment, IDc (ω, t) = IDc (t), IDm(ω, t) = IDm(t), ID(ω, t) = ID(t) for all ω ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the
R&D diﬃculty index is proportional to the size of the global market, that is X(ω, t) = 2κN(t).
2.5 Balanced growth
In this section I derive the steady state properties, where per-capita endogenous variables are
stationary. To close the model I need to introduce the labor market clearing condition and
the national resource constraints. From the free entry condition (9) we get
·
v
D
(t)/vD(t) = (1−
α)
·
X(t)/X(t)+α
·
L
K
(t)/LK(t). Using the R&D technology (7) research labor can be expressed as
a function of the innovation arrival rate.17 It follows that
·
L
F
(t)/LF (t) = [1/ (1− α)]
·
IF/IF +
·
X(t)/X(t) and
·
L
D
(t)/LD(t) = [1/ (1− α)]
µ ·
IDm/IDm +
·
IDc /IDc
¶
+
·
X(t)/X(t); since in steady
state the allocation of R&D labor is stationary, it means that
·
L
K
(t)/LK(t) =
·
X(t)/X(t).
Furthermore, using (8) we obtain
·
v
K
(t)/vK(t) =
·
X(t)/X(t) = n, for K = D, F . Finally, from
the Euler equation for consumption we get the steady state value of the interest rate, r(t) = ρ.
The unit cost of production for every good implies that the total production of goods
in a country is equal to the total labor used for manufacturing in that country. The total
manufacturing labor is given by the total labor supply minus the labor used in R&D. The
presence of multinationals implies that both the labor and goods markets clear globally. Thus,
the following condition clears both markets:µ
cD + cF
λ
¶
= 2− 2κ
"
ω
µ
IDc
A
¶ 1
1−α
+ (1− ω)
µ
IDm
A
¶ 1
1−α
+ ω
µ
IF
A
¶ 1
1−α
#
. (12)
17Using (7) we can express labor allocated to research as LD(t) = ωX(t)
¡
IDc (t)/A
¢1/(1−α)
+ (1 −
ω)X(t)
¡
IDm(t)/A
¢1/(1−α)
for the domestic country and LF (t) = ωX(t)
¡
IF (t)/A
¢1/(1−α)
for the foreign coun-
try respectively. From now on I will use these expressions in the place of labor allocated to research.
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The left hand side represents the total demand for goods (labor), while the right hand side is
the total supply, given by total labor resources minus labor used in research.
In each country total expenditures plus savings (investment in R&D) must equal national
income, wages plus profits (or interest income on assets).18
2κ
"
ω
µ
IDc
A
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1−α
+ (1− ω)
µ
IDm
A
¶ 1
1−α
#
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λ− 1
λ
¶ ∙
1− ω + ω I
D
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IDc + IF
¸
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2κ
"
ω
µ
IF
A
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1−α
#
+ cF = 1 + (cD + cF )
µ
λ− 1
λ
¶ ∙
ω
IF
IDc + IF
¸
. (14)
Notice that R&D investment is the wage bill of R&Dworkers and that each country appropriates
the monopoly rent in industries where that country is the world leader. Moreover, I am assuming
complete “home-bias” in asset ownership, in the sense that domestic firms are completely owned
domestically and foreign firms are completely foreign-owned.19
The international division of research labor specified in the previous section leads to the
following steady state expressions for equilibrium conditions (11):
2κ
A
(1− sF ) =
(cD + cF )
µ
λ− 1
λ
¶
ρ+ IDc + IF − n
µ
IF
A
¶ −α
1− α , ω ≤ ω
2κ
A
(1− sD) =
(cD + cF )
µ
λ− 1
λ
¶
ρ+ IDc + IF − n
µ
IDc
A
¶ −α
1− α , ω ≤ ω (15)
2κ
A
(1− sD) =
(cD + cF )
µ
λ− 1
λ
¶
ρ+ IDm − n
µ
IDm
A
¶ −α
1− α , ω > ω,
where, using R&D technology (7), we have expressed research labor as a function of the innova-
tion arrival rate. We have 6 equations and 5 unknowns
©
cD, cF , IDm , IDc , IF
ª
. The labor market
clearing condition (12) turns out to be the sum of the two resource constraints (13) and (14),
18In a similar two-country quality ladder model Segerstrom and Lundborg (2002) do not treat R&D expendi-
tures as investment. They acknowledge that R&D should be treated as investment in national accounts but in
reality, they claim, this is not done. We instead include R&D investment in the national budget constraint: one
implication of this is that taxes levied to fund R&D subsidy cancel out in the constraint with the reduction in
R&D costs due to subsidies. Considering R&D as current expenditure does not change our qualitative results.
19This assumption is supported by empirical evidence on home-bias in asset ownership. French and Poterba
(1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) estimated the percentage of aggregate stock market wealth invested in
domestic equities at the beginning of the 1990s to be well above 90% in the U.S. and Japan and around 80% in
the UK and Germany. I have also worked out a version of the model with partial home bias and the qualitative
results are unaﬀected, but the model becomes a bit less tractable.
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so the three equations are not linearly independent; I can omit one of them, and solve for the
three equations. in (15), and the remaining (13), (14).
I complete the description of the model by showing the expressions for welfare. Substituting
the steady state instantaneous utility of the household problem (1) into the discounted utility,
I obtain discounted welfare indicators for both countries,
WK ≡ ln c
K
λ
+
g
ρ− n (16)
where g =
£_
ω(IDc + IF ) +
¡
1− _ω
¢
IDm
¤
lnλ is the global growth rate that, which in our economy
with perfect international knowledge spillovers increases consumer surplus in both countries.
In the present framework with quality improving goods, “growth” is interpreted as the increase
over time of the representative consumers’ utility level.
Two-country endogenous growth models become complicated when either structural or pub-
lic policy diﬀerences aﬀect endogenous variables. Structural diﬀerences, in the form of asym-
metric research supports and policy diﬀerences, in the form of national R&D subsidies, are
crucial in my exploration of the eﬀect of international competition on national welfare and op-
timal policy. Therefore a simpler model with symmetric country, while analytically tractable,
would not allow me to analyze either this dimension of competition based on countries’ research
asymmetries, or the strategic policy game with two countries active in subsidizing R&D. For
this reason in the following sections I explore the implications of the model numerically.20
2.6 Calibration
In this section I calibrate the parameters of the model to match long-run empirical regularities
of the U.S. economy. I calibrate 6 parameters. Four of them, ρ, λ, n, and α are calibrated using
benchmarks from the growth and business cycle literatures, while the others, A and k, are
calibrated internally in order for the model’s steady state to match facts of the U.S. economy.21
This calibration exercise is exclusively targeted at understanding the qualitative properties of
20Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) for similar approach to the solution of quality ladders models of trade
and growth with asymmetric countries. Even when countries are symmetric models of trade and growth might
require the numerical solution when analyzing particularly rich market structure and its interaction with the
innovation process (see i.e. Costantini and Melitz, 2007, and Atkenson and Burnstein, 2007)
21Notice that, by calibrating the model on U.S. data I am implicitly assuming that the stylized facts presented
above are similar in the two economies.
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the model.22
Parameters calibrated “externally”- Some parameters of the model have close counter-
parts in real economies so that their calibration is straightforward. I set ρ, which in the steady
state is equal to the interest rate r, to 0.07 to match the average real return on the stock market
for the past century of 0.07, estimated in Mehra and Prescott (1985).23 I set λ to 1.2, to match
an average markup over the marginal cost of 20 per cent. This is consistent with the range
10− 40 percent reported in Basu (1996) estimates of average sectorial mark-up. I calibrate n
to match the population growth rate of 1.14%, which is the average business sector labor force
growth rate in the period 1948-97 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999). Decreasing returns due to
duplicative R&D at the country-level have been estimated to be between 0.1 and 0.6 (Kortum
1993), so as a benchmark I take an intermediate value and set the R&D externality coeﬃcient
α at 0.4.24
Parameters calibrated “internally”- I simultaneously choose A and κ so that the nu-
merical steady state solution of the model matches the following stylized facts: an average
growth rate for the US economy of 2.3% in the period 1951-2000 (Penn World Table). An aver-
age R&D investment, as a share of GDP, of 2.5% in the period 1951-2000 (NSF S&E Indicators
2004); consumption, as a share of GDP, of 0.67, in the period 1951-2004 (BEA NIPA tables).
I also use an initial value for the subsidy of both countries of 0.044, which is the average eﬀec-
tive R&D tax credit for the period 1981-90 estimated in Hall (1992). The parameters values
obtained minimizing the quadratic distance between the model steady state and the statistics
listed above are A = 0.4 and κ = 0.65.
22Both the model and the calibration exercise in Impullitti (2007) are more specifically targeted to explore
quantitative issues.
23Jones andWilliams (2000) suggest that the interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium
rate of return to R&D, and so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is
around 1%. They in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0.04 to
0.14.
24Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate of the degree of decreasing returns to R&D is 0.18 for the fully-
endogenous model. The empirical literature find estimates in the range (0.1, 0.6), hence I choose an intermediate
value as a benchmark and later perform sensitivity analysis in this range. See Hall et. al. (1988), Pakes and
Griliches (1984), and Kortum (1993) for more on empirical results on returns to R&D.
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3 The basic trade-oﬀ: business-stealing vs. the growth
eﬀect of competition on welfare
In this section I keep R&D subsidies in both countries constant and describe the two basic
eﬀects of increases in international competition on domestic welfare. Figure I below reports the
numerical simulation of the eﬀects of competition on the key variables of the model.
[FIGURE I ABOUT HERE]
Here I summarize the main findings:
Result 1. Stronger foreign competition (higher ω) produces the following eﬀects on the
domestic economy:
i. Reduces national profits and income - this is the BSE.
ii. It does not aﬀect innovation per-industry but it reduces total R&D spending.
iii. For α > 0 it increases the growth rate of the global economy - this is the GRE.
iv. The eﬀect on domestic welfare depends on the relative strength of the GRE and BSE.
Below I discuss the economic intuition for this result. First, the BSE reduces domestic
aggregate profits because foreign firms, by innovating in more sectors, appropriate a larger
share of the world market. The presence of multinational corporations implies that the labor
market is not aﬀected by shifts in the global distribution of firm ownership, and domestic
income decreases along with profits.25 Using the domestic resource constraint (13) we can see
that increases in the measure of competition ω reduce domestic profits, thereby reducing the
resources available for consumption, and negatively aﬀecting home welfare given by eq. (16).
Secondly, domestic innovation in the two types of sectors, competitive and non competitive,
is pinned down by the free entry condition (9). Since the cost of R&D is fixed at (1 − sK),
competition does not change the incentives to invest in R&D within each sector; it follows
that investment in R&D, IDm , IDc , IF do not change. Although per-sector investments are
25The assumption of global labor market allows us to focus on the eﬀect of competition on profits. Removing
this assumption would introduce an additional negative eﬀect of competition on domestic income, precisely a
wage-stealing and/or a job-stealing eﬀect. As I discuss later, adding this feature to the model will not aﬀects
the basic results.
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constant, total domestic R&D expenditure, along with total innovation in the home country,
decreases with competition for the reallocation eﬀect produced by the increase in ω: foreign
research increases innovation obsolescence and domestic followers adapt by reducing their R&D
eﬀorts. More precisely, when a sector experiences foreign entry, in equilibrium domestic R&D
investment declines from the non-competitive level IDm to the competitive one IDc .26
Digging deeper into the GRE of competition, we can observe that it depends entirely on
the presence of local decreasing returns in R&D. Intuitively, the negative country-specific R&D
externality α in (7) implies that research labor is more productive when spread more evenly
around the globe than when concentrated in one country. More precisely, the decision to invest
in innovation is determined by two margins: the allocation of labor between production of
goods and R&D, and the allocation of R&D between competitive and non-competitive sectors.
As discussed above, the first margin is not aﬀected by competition because. Using (15) consider
now the marginal benefits of investing in research in a competitive and a non-competitive sector.
In equilibrium the no-arbitrage condition between investing in a R&D firm in a competitive
industry and in a non-competitive industry requires the two marginal benefits to be equal:
(cD + cF )
¡
λ−1
λ
¢
ρ+ IDm − n
µ
IDm
A
¶ −α
1− α
=
(cD + cF )
¡
λ−1
λ
¢
ρ+ IDc + IF − n
µ
IDc
A
¶ −α
1− α . (17)
Since the productivity of R&D is higher in the competitive industries - due to the country-
specific R&D externality - the present value of the firm in equilibrium must be lower in these
industries. As the value of the firm is given by profits - equal in both industries - discounted with
the interest rate and the innovation intensity, vK(ω, t) = (cD + cF ) (1− 1/λ) /
¡
ρ+ IDm − n
¢
,
investment in R&D in competitive sectors must be higher than in non-competitive sectors;
that is, IDc + IF > IDm . Since, as discussed above, innovation per-sector does not change,
competition simply increases the share of industries with a higher arrival rate of innovation,
thereby producing a positive eﬀect on the aggregate growth rate of the economy - ∂g/∂
_
ω =£¡
IDc + IF
¢
− IDm
¤
log λ > 0 for all α > 0.27
Thus, we can conclude that the welfare eﬀects of competition depend on the value of the
parameters and, in particular, on the strength of the R&D externality pinned down by the
26Notice that here, as in the benchmark quality ladder model, leading firms do not innovate. This happens
because if we assume that leaders do not have any cost advantage in R&D over follovers, the latter have higher
incentives to innovate at the margin; this is known as the Arrow eﬀect (see Aghion and Howitt,1998). Later we
will discuss possible implications of introducing innovation by leaders.
27When α = 0 it is easy to see that (17) implies IDc + I
F = IDm and the growth eﬀect disappears.
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value of α. Figure I shows that in the benchmark calibration, where α is 0.4, the GRE is larger
than the BSE, and foreign competition leads to welfare improvements in the home country.
I have also performed simulations for lower levels of α and I found that for α < 0.2 foreign
competition reduces domestic welfare.
4 Foreign competition and optimal non-cooperative sub-
sidies
Next, I compute the optimal strategic R&D subsidy for both countries and explore the impact
of increasing foreign competition on the optimal domestic subsidy. A two-stage policy game
between the two countries is set up: at stage 1, governments set their subsidies; at stage 2, R&D
and manufacturing firms choose their profit-maximizing level of activity, and households choose
their utility-maximizing consumption bundles and asset holdings. For each level of competition
and for each level of the other country’s subsidy, policy makers set their subsidy according to
the following best-response functions
sDn (s
F
n ;ω) = argmax
©
WD(sDn , s
F
n ;ω)
ª
, (18)
sFn (s
D
n ;ω) = argmax
©
WF (sDn , s
F
n ;ω)
ª
. (19)
Below I show that this policy game yields a Nash equilibrium pair of subsidies, s∗Dn (s∗Fn ;ω)
and s∗Fn (s∗Dn ;ω), as a function of the level of competition.28 Figures 1 to 3 show the Nash
equilibrium for diﬀerent levels of competition.
[FIGURES 2-4 ABOUT HERE]
Result 2. Increases in foreign competition trigger a defensive R&D subsidy response: higher
levels of ω lead to higher optimal strategic subsidy in the home country s∗Dn (s∗Fn ;ω).
The first step in understanding this result is to explain that the best-response functions
obtained in the simulation confirm the presence of strategic policy complementarity, with a Nash
equilibrium existing at each level of competition. To show why R&D subsidies are strategic
28The subscript n stands for non-cooperative subsidies.
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complements we need to understand how changes in a country’s subsidy aﬀect the marginal
conditions used by the other country’s policy makers to set the optimal subsidy. I do this by
expressing the welfare equation in a form that facilitates intuition, and by decomposing the
marginal eﬀects of subsidies on national welfare. The present value of national welfare (16) in
both countries can be written as
WK ≡ (ρ− n)U = ln c
K
λ
+
gK
ρ− n = G+ Y
K −RK, for K = D,F, (20)
where G equals the present value of the growth rate, G = gK/ (ρ− n); using the national
budget (resource) constraints, consumption is rewritten as national income Y K = wK + ΠK
(wages wK plus total profits ΠK =
R 1
0
πK(ω, t)dω) minus savings (investment in R&D RK =
wK
R 1
0
IK(ω, t)dω).29
I now focus on the domestic country and I will first explain the intuition for the result in
figure 6. Innovation in this framework has four external eﬀects aﬀecting the level of optimal
domestic subsidies: a consumer-surplus or growth eﬀect (GRE), a domestic business-stealing
eﬀect (DBSE), an iinternational business-stealing eﬀect (IBSE), and a resource constraint
eﬀect (RCE). First, the GRE has two diﬀerent components: the direct consumer surplus
eﬀect and the intertemporal spillover eﬀect. Consumers benefit from a higher-quality product
when it is introduced by the current innovator, this is the direct eﬀect, and also after it has
been replaced by the next innovators who build on the previous quality ladder, this is the
intertemporal eﬀect. Since R&D firms do not take these eﬀects on consumer surplus into
account, they lead to underinvestment in innovation.
Secondly, in industries with domestic leaders every time a home firm innovates it drives
another home firm out of business. The appropriation of the incumbent firm’s monopoly profits
reduces aggregate profits and consumption, thus having a negative eﬀect on welfare. This is the
DBSE and in (20) it aﬀects ΠD, the per-capita aggregate real profits of the innovating country.
This eﬀect is external to the decision of the innovating firm and so it leads to overinvestment
in R&D.
Thirdly, in sectors with foreign incumbents successful domestic innovation drives foreign
firms out of business and shifts monopolistic profits toward the home country, thereby increasing
domestic income and welfare. This is the IBSE, which in our utility metric (20) works on ΠD.
29All values for the new expression for consumption are in logs. The expressions in extensive form for wages,
profits, and R&D expenditures for both countries can be found in (13) and (14 ).
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Since home R&D firms do not take this eﬀect into account when innovating, a bias toward
underinvestment is produced.
Finally, because of the externality represented by α in technology (7), R&D investment by a
national firm increases the sectorial level of research and reduces the productivity of future firms
investing in that industry in that country. This is the RCE and has the following components:
first, more resources must be allocated to R&D in order to maintain the steady state level
of innovation, this makes fewer resources available for consumption. Second, as consumption
is reduced, incumbent firms profits in all sectors will also be reduced, resulting in even lower
consumption. Since R&D firms do not take this eﬀect into account, this produces another bias
toward overinvestment. Both components aﬀect welfare through the resource constraint: in the
metric of our utility function in (20) they aﬀect RD = ln(LD/λ), total labor resources allocated
to R&D, and the total profit ΠD respectively.30 Using (20) we can express the diﬀerent marginal
eﬀects of the R&D subsidy on domestic welfare as follows:
∂WD
∂sD
=
∂(RD,ΠD)
∂sD| {z }
RCE
(−)
+
∂G
∂sD|{z}
GRE
(+)
+
∂ΠD
∂sD| {z }
IBSE
(+)
+
∂ΠD
∂sD| {z }
DBSE
(−)
, (21)
where the plus and minus signs signal that the external eﬀect leads respectively to underin-
vestment, thereby motivating R&D subsidies, and overinvestment, thereby motivating R&D
taxes.
The main force driving strategic policy complementarity is the strategic motive for sub-
sidy: higher foreign subsidies produce a higher intensity of foreign business stealing, thereby
strengthening the role of home subsidies in protecting domestic rents -this is indicated by IBSE
in (21). It follows that an increase in sF improves the marginal eﬀects of sD on welfare, thus
raising the optimal domestic subsidy.
Next, I discuss the economic intuition for result 2. In figures 2-4 we can see that increases
in competition shift the domestic best-response function upwards, while also making it steeper.
The driving force of these changes is again the IBSE. As international R&D rivalry rises, the
foreign rent-stealing threat becomes more relevant and triggers higher domestic subsidies. It is
possible to see in eq. (13) that the rent-protecting eﬀect of sD is zero at ω = 0, and increases
30This eﬀect is sometimes called in the literature ‘intertemporal R&D spillovers eﬀect’ because it depends on
the impact of current innovation on future R&D productivity.
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with competition. Higher foreign competition implies a higher scale of foreign business-stealing
because the number of industries where domestic firms are challenged by foreigners is larger.
It follows that the role of domestic subsidies as a rent-protecting device rises. Moreover, the
same force makes the domestic best response steeper, which implies that the sensitivity of
the optimal sD to changes in sF rises. Intuitively, the increase in foreign competition implies
that each dollar of foreign subsidy represents an increasingly serious threat to the domestic
leadership.31
Although the optimal subsidy increases primarily for the strategic reasons that I have just
discussed, foreign competition, by increasing the productivity of domestic R&D, also improves
both the GRE and the RCE of home subsidies. Indeed, the presence of the country-specific
R&D externality in (7) implies that research eﬃciency is higher in competitive sectors. Hence,
an increase in the number of these sectors raises the aggregate productivity of domestic research
labor, and reduces the labor resources required to maintain the steady state level of innovation.
A final remark on the sign of the optimal R&D subsidy is necessary. In quality-ladder
growth models whether the optimal R&D subsidy is positive or negative depends on the relative
strength of the several externalities involved. Similarly to Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Segerstrom (1998), in this model the sign of the optimal subsidies depends on parameter
specifications. In the section on robustness I will show that the main results of the paper
are confirmed also when the parameter specification is such that the optimal R&D subsidy is
negative.
5 The gains from policy cooperation
International policy competition yields national subsidies that are not optimal from a global
point of view for the following reasons: first, governments do not take into account the positive
innovation eﬀect of R&D subsidies on foreign growth rate (and consumer surplus); second, the
negative business-stealing eﬀect of national subsidies on foreign aggregate profits is not consid-
31In this paper I am interested in studying the domestic country, the former leader that experiences increasing
competition from the foreign follower. Thus, I comment only briefly on the latter. The smaller change in foreign
optimal subsidies is the result of a general equilibrium eﬀect. On the one hand, an increase in ω raises both
foreign innovation and its national aggregate profits, so for each sD the level of sF that maximizesWF should be
lower; indeed, the foreign best-response function shifts left - as we see in the figures. On the other hand, the fact
that the domestic best-response function shifts upward, as ω increases, triggers strategic complementarity: the
foreign policy maker reacts by raising its subsidy - this is a movement along the foreign country’s best-response
function. The relatively minor eﬀect of competition on foreign subsidies is the general equilibrium result of
these two counteracting forces.
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ered by governments in maximizing their own welfare. Hence, the need for policy coordination
emerges.
In this section, I introduce a R&D policy coordination that internalizes the business-stealing
eﬀect and takes into account the growth eﬀect of subsidies in both countries. I consider a form
of cooperation where subsidies are set separately by governments in order to maximize a welfare
function that is a linear combination of national and world welfare.
sDco(s
F
co;ω, β) = argmax
©
TD(sDco, s
F
c0;ω, β)
ª
,
sFco(s
D
co;ω, β) = argmax
©
TF (sDco, s
F
co;ω, β)
ª
,
where
TK = (1− β)WK + βWW , for K = D,F (22)
is the the objective function of policy maker K and
WW =WD +WF = 2G+ (Y D + Y F )− (RD +RF ) (23)
is the global welfare equation. In the objective function (22) the degree of cooperation among
countries is pinned down by β: with full cooperation, β = 1, each country sets subsidies to
maximize global welfare; with no cooperation, β = 0, countries maximize their own welfare.
I numerically compute the optimal subsidies under cooperation, sDco and sFc0, and compare the
welfare outcome of cooperative and non cooperative policies. I assume that there is no ex-post
scheme available to winners to compensate losers. Therefore cooperation will be implemented
only when it benefits both countries. Table I below shows the result.
[TABLE I HERE]
In this exercise I explore a setup with partial cooperation because the internal calibration of
parameters is done on the benchmark model with no cooperation. If we change the framework
by introducing some degree of cooperation, the calibrated model does not to lead to realistic
equilibrium values for our variables anymore; in particular we would obtain unrealistic subsidy
levels. With low levels of cooperation, i.e. β = 0.2, we are able to compare two frameworks
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that are too diﬀerent, which allows us to explore the qualitative implications of the cooperative
solution without obtaining unrealistic subsidy levels. As shown in the appendix on robustness
analysis, qualitative results are not aﬀected when the model with total cooperation is used.32
The basic result can be summarized as follows:
Result 3. For a country facing increases in foreign competition - the domestic country -
the incentives to cooperate increase with competition but are negative for
_
ω <
_
ω∗ ∈ (0.1, 0.2).
For the foreign country, gains from cooperation are positive and decreasing in
_
ω. Overall, policy
cooperation increases global welfare for every 0 <
_
ω < 1 but, in the absence of a compensation
scheme, it will not be implemented at levels of competition below
_
ω∗.
In order to understand the mechanisms at work here we need to examine the eﬀects of
domestic subsidies on the objective function TK . Equation (24) below shows the eﬀects of
domestic subsidies on world welfare.
∂TW
∂sD
=
∂RD
∂sD| {z }
RCE
(−)
+ (1 + β)
∂G
∂sD| {z }
GRE
(+)
+
∂ΠD
∂sD| {z }
IBSE
(+)
+ β
∂ΠF
∂sD| {z }
IBSE
(−)
. (24)
Comparing (24) with (21) we can observe that two additional eﬀects appear in the case with
cooperation.33 First, we see the internalization of the negative IBSE of domestic subsidies on
foreign profits: a fraction β of the damage inflicted upon the foreign country by subsidy-led
profit-stealing is internalized. Second, domestic subsidies have an additional growth eﬀect,
βGRE, because policy cooperation takes into account the positive innovation eﬀect of home
R&D subsidies on foreign welfare.
As foreign competition increases, leading country’s incentives to cooperate rise. In the sixth
column of table II we can see that domestic gains from cooperation are negative at
_
ω = 0.1
and positive at
_
ω = 0.2. Intuitively, the domestic government has little incentive to cooperate
when competition is low because foreign business-stealing does not represent a suﬃcient threat.
Hence, when the competitive threat is low, the home country benefits less from internalizing
foreign business-stealing, while the opposite happens in the foreign country.
32The choice of the non cooperative framework as the benchmark is not relevent. The results would not be
aﬀected if the benchmark would be be represented by a low level of cooperation, say β = 0.2, and I would
compare it to a higher level of cooperation.
33I have omitted the DBSE because it is not key for explaining the intuition.
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The intuition for the positive global gains from cooperation is straightforward: on the one
hand, in setting subsidies non-cooperatively neither government takes into account the GRE
of its subsidies on the other country’s welfare, thereby producing an incentive to free ride on
innovation subsidies; on the other hand, competitive subsidies do not take into account the
negative IBSE on the other country, thus creating a beggar-thy-neighbor eﬀect. These two
external eﬀects produce a prisoner-dilemma type of outcome that leads to lower levels of global
welfare.
Finally, there is another result in table II worthy of mention: optimal subsidies are higher
under cooperation. Internalizing the negative IBSE on foreign income reduces the strategic
motive for subsidies, thus reducing sD∗co (sFco;ω, β); whereas the positive GRE on foreign welfare
increases the growth motive, thus increasing sD∗co (sFco;ω, β). Depending on the relative strength
of these two eﬀects the optimal cooperative subsidy can be higher or lower than the non-
cooperative one. In the next section I will discuss the features of the model that are key for
this result.34
6 Discussion
In this section I briefly discuss some issues arising from the results obtained above. I first
explore the implications of diﬀerent degrees of substitutability among goods and of imperfect
international knowledge spillovers. Secondly, I discuss the relation between competition and
growth predicted by the model. Thirdly, I analyze the importance of introducing growth in a
strategic industrial policy game.
Goods substitutability. Here I informally discuss how extending the model to account
for diﬀerent degrees of substitutability among goods would aﬀect the results. If from the
Cobb-Douglas benchmark I would increase the substitutability of goods that the two countries
produce, the business stealing eﬀect of subsidies (IBSE) becomes higher. As a consequence,
the strategic motive for subsidy is higher and the positive eﬀect of competition on the opti-
mal domestic subsidy will be larger. Hence, higher (lower) substitutability among goods will
strengthen (weaken) result 2; qualitatively the result will not hold only in the extreme case
34The intuition for the relationship between the optimal domestic subsidy and competition is similar to that
in result 1: on the one hand, the IBSE is partially neutralized by cooperation, so the strategic motive for
subsidies is weaker; on the other hand, competition, by improving the eﬃciency of home R&D, improves the
RCE and the GRE of home subsidies, thereby increasing optimal subsidies.
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where substitutability among goods is zero. Secondly, result 3 will be aﬀected as follows: as
higher (lower) substitutability implies higher (lower) IBSE, cooperation will be beneficial at
levels of competition lower (higher) than those shown in table II. Finally, a high IBSE implies
that, by internalizing it through cooperation, the major motivation for subsidies, the strategic
one, disappears, thus making cooperative subsidies lower than the non-cooperative ones; the
opposite will happen when good become less substitutable.35 The intuition provided here sug-
gests that the two basic findings of the paper, result 2 and 3, should not be aﬀected qualitatively
by enriching the framework along these lines.
International knowledge spillovers. If we would depart from the assumption of perfect
international spillovers the eﬀect of domestic subsidy on foreign innovation, growth, and welfare
becomes weaker. This will aﬀect the results as follows: first, since foreign innovation will free-
ride less on domestic R&D, the strategic role of domestic subsidies will be stronger and the
positive eﬀect of competition on optimal non-cooperative subsidies shown in result 2 will be
reinforced. Second, for the same reason, the level of competition at which cooperation becomes
beneficial for the domestic countries will be reduced. Finally, when the eﬀect of subsidy-led
domestic innovation on foreign growth is weaker, internalizing it through cooperation produces
a smaller increase in the optimal domestic cooperative subsidy. It follows that the eﬀect of the
internalization of the IBSE will be higher and the optimal cooperative subsidy will be lower
than the non-cooperative ones.36
Competition and growth. Although, as specified above, the model does not attempt any
quantitative analysis it is worth to briefly discuss the prediction of a positive relation between
competition and growth shown in figure I. If we were to apply this model to the post-WWII
world, in which, using our taxonomy, the U.S. would be the leading country and Europe and
Japan the followers, the prediction would be that foreign catching-up in R&D increases growth
both in the U.S. and in foreign countries. Provided that we observe a technological catching-
up of Japan and Europe in the post-War period, the model would predict an increasing U.S.
growth rate. This would be at odds with the lack of evidence of a positive trend in the U.S.
growth rate in the post-War period (Jones 1995). A few remarks are necessary.
35Haaland and Kind (2006) in a simpler set up with two countries, two goods and without neither knowledge
spillovers nor growth show that the diﬀerence between cooperative and uncooperative subsidies depends on the
degree of substitutability between goods.
36Leahy and Neary (2001) introduce static knowledge spillovers and show that, depending on the degree of
spillovers, national governments may undersubsidize or oversubsidize R&D.
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First, as shown in figure I the eﬃciency eﬀect of competition produces a reduction of total
R&D investment in the leading country and an increase in the foreign country. Since interna-
tional knowledge spillovers are perfect, growth in each country benefits equally from domestic
and foreign innovation. Empirical evidence suggests substantial, but not perfect, international
sharing of ideas.37 Hence, one way to improve the empirical fit of the model could be to re-
move the simplifying assumption of perfect international spillovers. In this case, the increase
in foreign sources of U.S. growth brought about by competition could be compensated by the
reduction of domestic sources of growth, and the overall growth eﬀect would be reduced. Im-
pullitti (2007) constructs an index of international R&D competition to explicitly measure ω
in a two-country world with the U.S. as the leader and Europe and Japan as the followers and
finds a substantial increase in competition in the period 1973− 1991: ω rises from 0.38 in 1973
to 0.76 in 1991. Partial international knowledge spillovers are calibrated using the evidence
in Eaton and Kortum (1999) and the increases in the growth rate produced by the observed
increase in ω is substantially smaller than that observed in figure I.
Secondly, as the robustness analysis in the appendix shows, the basic results of this paper
do not depend on the growth eﬀect of competition. In fact, all simulations in the model can
be repeated for α → 0 obtaining negligible eﬀects on growth and still revealing a substantial
positive eﬀect of competition on optimal subsidies. This occurs because the driving force of
result 2 is the IBSE, and not the GRE. Result 4 would also be confirmed because cooperation,
by internalizing the IBSE, would always reduce the distortions produced by policy competition;
the leader’s incentives to cooperate, and internalize the IBSE, are still going to be aﬀected by
the scale of foreign challenge along the same lines.38 The assumption of an R&D technology
subject to decreasing returns that drives theGRE makes the model more general, while allowing
for the study of a richer interaction between competition, welfare and optimal subsidies.
Thirdly, the basic results could be also obtained in a semi-endogenous growth model (i.e.
37Using patent data for the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and the U.K., Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate
the extent to which these countries share their ideas. They find that each country adopts from one half to three
fourths of the ideas generated abroad. Moreover, using a decomposition of productivity growth sources they
provide an additional way of quantifying technology diﬀusion: they find that the U.S. and Japan contribute to
two thirds or more to growth in each of the five countries, and only in the U.S. does most of growth come from
domestic innovation.
38Notice also that even when the growth eﬀect of competition is eliminated, the paper still adds a new result
to the existing studies on the strategic innovation policy: in an economy with a continuum of monopolistic
competitive industries it studies the eﬀect of foreign R&D entry into home-led industries on the business-stealing
motive for subsidies and on the incentives for policy cooperation among asymmetric countries.
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Segerstrom, 1998, Jones 1995, Kortum 1997), where competition and public policies do not
aﬀect steady state growth. In this case the growth eﬀect of competition and subsidies would
be observed only along the transition to the steady state. Unless the convergence to the steady
state is immediate the eﬀects of innovation on the levels of consumption, quantity and quality,
would still be there and aﬀect national welfare similarly to what has been shown above.
Growth and strategic R&D subsidies. Strategic trade and industrial policies can have
substantial eﬀects on economic growth that have not been explored in the existing literature.
Brander (1995) suggests that understanding the interaction between strategic policy and growth
is a promising field for future research: “The static one-shot gains or losses from trade policy
changes that are estimated in strategic trade policy models are larger than in traditional trade
policy models, but still seem to be of modest size. It is possible that the eﬀect of trade policy
on growth might be more important still” (p. 1450). Leaving explicit quantitative analysis for
future research, I briefly discuss here the mechanism through which growth could amplify the
“size” of gains and losses produced by strategic policy interactions.39
In the previous sections we have observed that the existence of positive gains form coop-
erative R&D subsidies results from the internalization of both the GRE and the IBSE of
subsidies. Reducing the importance of innovation-driven growth in the model will reduce the
distortions produced by the growth eﬀect of subsidies, thus diminishing the gains from coop-
eration. To understand the economic mechanism we need to recall the two components of the
external eﬀect of innovation on consumer surplus. On the one hand, there is a direct con-
sumer surplus eﬀect, which benefits current consumers and, on the other hand, we have the
intertemporal spillover eﬀect, realized when future generations of innovators build on present
innovations, thereby benefiting future consumption. In a static model, the absence of intertem-
poral knowledge spillovers does not allow for an account of the dynamic eﬀects of innovation:
investments in R&D have a positive eﬀect on consumers’ surplus through cost reductions or
quality improvements, but this eﬀect does not last forever. Hence, if the role of the cumulative
nature of innovation is reduced, the welfare benefit from internalizing the GRE of subsidies
through cooperation will also be lower.40
39Impullitti (2007) presents a version of this model extended to specifically fit a set of stylized facts and
performs a quantitative welfare analysis of the R&D subsidy response to competition in the U.S..
40One simple way to show this is to increase the intertemporal discount rate ρ and show that gains from
cooperation decline. This exercise is performed in the appendix and confirms that reducing the GRE of subsidies
on welfare produces lower gains from policy cooperation.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the interaction between international technological competition
and optimal competitive and cooperative R&D subsidy in two asymmetric growing economies.
The dimension of competition that I explore is based on a leader-follower representation of the
global economy where the leading country innovates in a broader set of industries than the
follower.
I have shown that the eﬀect of foreign competition on domestic welfare depends on the
relative strength of two eﬀects: the standard business-stealing eﬀect that, by switching monop-
olistic rents from domestic to foreign firms, reduces domestic profits, income, and welfare; the
increase the eﬃciency of global innovation brought about by foreign entry raises the growth
rate of goods quality, thus benefiting domestic welfare. The overall eﬀect of competition on
welfare depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting forces.
Secondly, I have found that increases in competition trigger a defensive R&D subsidies
mechanism: the optimal domestic subsidy increases with the number of sectors where domestic
and foreign firms compete in innovation. As competition increases, the role of subsidies in
protecting domestic rents becomes more relevant. Thirdly, the strategic motive for subsidies
suggests the importance of evaluating the gains from cooperation in R&D policy. Implement-
ing the cooperative solution and comparing it to the non-cooperative outcome, I find that the
leading country loses from cooperation at low levels of competition, and begins to gain when
a suﬃciently high number of sectors is competitive. Hence, the presence of innovation asym-
metries among countries, in terms of distribution of research eﬀorts across sectors, can create
obstacles to the implementation of cooperative R&D subsidies.
The paper is amenable to many extensions. First, I have assumed the scale of international
competition to be exogenous. Introducing imitative R&D, or letting the set of competitive
sectors depend on institutional and social factors, can provide a link between competition and
economic decisions, thereby endogenizing the degree of technological competition.41
41A related issue here is that entry of foreign innovators in new sectors may be produced by favourable tax
policies, such as R&D subsidies: this would imply that my measure of competition depends on R&D subsidies.
Although this is a plausible case, entry into new industries is most probably related to structural innovation
policies that allow firms to pay large initial start up costs. Examples of these policies are those implemented by
MITI in Japan in the 1970s, and those introduced in the 1970s and 1980s in the U.S. to promote commercial
innovation. In the U.S. experience policies like the Bayh-Dole, the National Cooperative Research, and the
Federal Technology Transfer Acts, set the instutional framework that allowed firms, especially small firms, to
avoid paying the high fixed initial costs of innovation. Tax breaks, like the Research and Experimentation Tax
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Secondly, in order to isolate the role of the specific dimension of technological competition
studied in the paper, I have omitted the interactions between foreign R&D entry and market
structure. It is plausible that when a sector experiences entry of foreign researchers there
could be a change in the structure of that market, with consequent changes in product market
competition. Future research could explore this link and provide a richer analysis of the welfare
eﬀects of competition in global innovation races. Extensions in this direction could benefit from
the adoption of the last generation quality-ladders models in which innovation by incumbents
is introduced (e.g. Peretto 2003, Etro 2004, Segerstrom 2006, Aghion et el., 2006). In these
frameworks foreign entry could trigger an aggressive innovation response by domestic leaders,
thereby providing an additional channel for competition to aﬀect growth.
Forth, the assumption of global labor markets implies that the labor market is not aﬀected
by changes in competition. The rent-shifting eﬀect of competition aﬀects only the international
distribution of firm ownership; neither job-displacements nor wage adjustments take place; do-
mestic plants are simply taken over by foreign owners. This conservative assumption reduces
the impact of business-stealing on welfare, thus understating the negative welfare eﬀect of com-
petition. If we were to remove this assumption, the BSE would reduce both profits and wages,
thereby increasing the negative impact of competition on national income and strengthening
the strategic motive for subsidies.42
Finally, in the model the asymmetry between countries is limited to the distribution of
research eﬀorts; introducing local labor markets, as well as other structural diﬀerences (e.g.,
production and innovation technology, skilled labor endowments), would make the model more
suitable to study the eﬀects of the arrival of China and India as global players in technologically
advanced industries.
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8 Appendix: robustness analysis
In this appendix I explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in parameter specifications.
In the comments I will focus on result 2 and 3, which are those where the eﬀects of changing
parameters are more significative.43 First, I will show that the results are confirmed with full
policy cooperation - that is with β = 1. Then I will analyze the eﬀects of halving the parameters
of interest with respect to their benchmark value.44 Here I will only show the sensitivity of
the results to changes in two key parameters, the R&D externality index α that produces the
growth eﬀects of competition, and the quality jump λ that determines the sign of the optimal
subsidy.45
Table II below shows that the results are confirmed with full policy cooperation.46 As I
mentioned above, the optimal cooperative subsidy levels are very high because the framework
is very far from the benchmark on which the parameters have been calibrated. Nevertheless,
in comparing table I and II, we can observe qualitatively similar findings. Two more things are
of note: first, the competition threshold above which the home country starts benefiting from
cooperation is higher than in table I,
_
ω∗ ∈ (0.3, 0.4). This occurs because under full cooperation
the home country internalizes the BSE inflicted upon the foreign country completely; thus,
cooperation becomes beneficial only under a higher competitive threat. Second, global gains
from cooperation are larger than in the partial cooperation case for all values of ω. Although
quantitatively this result could be biased by the calibration issue discussed above, higher degrees
of cooperation, by reducing ineﬃcient subsidy competition, will always yield larger welfare
gains.
[TABLE II HERE]
In table III I study the eﬀects of a reduction in α from the benchmark value 0.4 to 0.2. As we
can see, all results are confirmed. By comparing tables I and III we observe that one remarkable
eﬀect of reducing the negative R&D externality is that gains from cooperation become higher
43Result 1 is fairly general in that changes in parameters only influence the business-stealing and the growth
eﬀects quantitatively, with no changes in the qualitative outcome shown in figure 1. Appendix B available upon
request contains the complete robustness analysis.
44I have also performed the sensitivity analysis for specifications in which the benchmark values are doubled
and have obtained results that are symmetric to those discussed below; I omit them for simplicity.
45The sensitivity analysis for other less crucial parameters is in appendix B.
46For simplicity I will only show simulation results for the points in the grid for ω that are relevant to the
explaination.
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at all levels of competition except the highest one. This eﬀect is due to the fact that weaker
decreasing returns in R&D raise the eﬀect of government subsidies on innovation. It follows
that global policy cooperation leading to higher equilibrium subsidies has a larger eﬀect on
welfare, and produces higher welfare gains. The eﬀect of lower α on the global gains from
cooperation is decreasing in competition, and disappear at ω = 1, because a lower negative
country-specific R&D externality aﬀects productivity of home researchers more when most of
the innovation activity is performed by the home country - that is at low levels of competition.
[TABLE III HERE]
In table IV, I report the eﬀects of halving the mark-up from the benchmark value of 20 per
cent: a reduction of the mark-up to 10 per cent produces a reduction of the quality jump λ
from 1.2 to 1.1. The main results are confirmed. One relevant eﬀect of reducing the size of
innovation is that at low levels of competition the home uncooperative R&D subsidy is negative.
Competition, however, aﬀects the optimal home subsidies in the usual way: it reduces the tax
on R&D until, for high values of ω, the optimal subsidy becomes positive and increasing in ω.
To explain the link between the optimal subsidy and the quality jump we need to focus on the
external eﬀects of innovation.
[TABLE IV HERE]
The explanation is based on the analysis of the external eﬀects of subsidies discussed above.
Following the same procedure as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998) but
considering a one-country version of the model (a version where only domestic firms innovate,
ω = 0), and also assuming α = 0, it is possible to show that the expected value of the two
positive external eﬀects of subsidies on consumer surplus (the GRE) is equal to lnλ/(ρ−n).47
Since R&D firms do not take these eﬀects into account, they will underinvest in innovation. It
follows that underinvestment rises with λ. With the same procedure we find that the expected
value of the BSE is equal to (λ− 1) /(ρ + I − n), which is increasing in λ. Because of the
assumption of decreasing marginal utility in (1) lnλ/(ρ − n) is a strictly concave function,
thereby rising levels of λ increase the bias toward overinvestment and reduce the level of the
optimal subsidy. To compute the RCE it is necessary to keep the R&D externality, that is
47See Grossman and Helpman (1991) p. 110, and Segerstrom (1998) appendix B.
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to set α > 0, but unfortunately in this case an analytical solution is not attainable even in
the simple model. Therefore, I suggest an explanation based on economic intuition: in quality
ladder models the private incentive to innovate is positively related to the size of innovation λ;
since the private incentive to innovate is the source of our externality, it is plausible to expect
that the RCE increases with the size of quality jumps.48
This sensitivity analysis on the quality jump λ shows that, even with parameter values
that weaken the growth motive for subsidies and lead to optimal negative subsidies at low
values of ω, the business-stealing motive still guarantees a positive relation between foreign
competition and optimal home subsidies. Moreover, at suﬃciently high level of ω the IBSE
is strong enough to more than compensate for the weak growth motive, thus making optimal
home subsidies positive.
TABLE I
Gains from (partial) cooperation
β = 0.2 Coop No-Coop Gains D Gains F Global gains
ω sDco sFco sDn sFn
¡
WDco−WD
¢
/WD
¡
WFco−WF
¢
/WF
¡
WWco −WW
¢
/WW
0 .275 .4 .075 0.27 -.0175 .2328 .0961
.1 .285 .4 .1 0.27 -.0051 .2018 .0905
.2 .3 .4 .12 0.275 .0065 .1746 .0857
.4 .325 .4 .17 0.28 .0262 .1277 .0753
.6 .355 .4 .215 0.28 .0420 .1010 .0711
.8 .38 .4 .255 0.29 .0510 .0799 .0654
1 .405 .405 .29 0.29 .0654 .0654 .0654
TABLE II
Gains from full cooperation
β = 1 Coop No-Coop Gains D Gains F Global gains
ω sDco sDn
¡
WDco−WD
¢
/WD
¡
WFco−WF
¢
/WF
¡
WWco −WW
¢
/WW
0.2 0.65 0.12 -0.131 0.6603 0.2412
0.3 0.67 0.1450 -0.0500 0.5729 0.2475
0.4 0.69 0.17 0.0009 0.5231 0.2534
0.8 0.77 0.255 0.2006 0.3494 0.2745
1 0.8 0.29 0.2849 0.2849 0.2849
48Segerstrom (1998) formalizes this result but with a diﬀerent source of declining R&D productivity.
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TABLE III
Gains from partial cooperation with α = 0.2
β = 0.2 Coop No-Coop Gains D Gains F Global gains
ω sDco sDn
¡
WDco−WD
¢
/WD
¡
WFco−WF
¢
/WF
¡
WWco −WW
¢
/WW
0.2 0.345 0.18 -0.0030 0.4582 0.1939
0.3 0.35 0.205 0.0099 0.2925 0.1388
0.4 0.35 0.225 0.0190 0.1999 0.1049
0.8 0.35 0.275 0.0462 0.0899 0.0678
1 0.355 0.295 0.0554 0.0554 0.0554
TABLE IV
gains from partial cooperation with λ = 1.1
β = 0.2 Coop Non-Coop Gains D Gains F Global gains
ω sDco sDn
¡
WDco−WD
¢
/WD
¡
WFco−WF
¢
/WF
¡
WWco −WW
¢
/WW
0.2 0.02 -0.245 -0.004 0.356 0.108
0.4 0.105 -0.085 0.011 0.176 0.077
0.5 0.145 -0.02 0.017 0.135 0.067
0.8 0.24 0.125 0.035 0.071 0.052
1 0.29 0.195 0.049 0.049 0.049
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FIGURE 3. Optimal subsidies with 60 % of competitive sectors
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FIGURE 4. Optimal susbsidies with 100% of competitive sectors
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